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ABSTRACT 
Piracy is potentially possible at any stage of the lifetime of the software. In a post-piracy situation, 
however, the growth of the respective versions of the software (both the original and pirated) is 
expected to be in different directions as a result of expectedly different implementation strategies. This 
paper shows how such post-piracy modifications are of special interest to a cyber crime expert 
investigating software piracy and suggests that the present software piracy forensic (or software 
copyright infringement investigation) approaches require amendments to take in such modifications. 
For this purpose, the paper also presents a format that is jargon-free, so as to present the findings in a 
more intelligible form to the judicial authorities.  
Keywords: Piracy, post-piracy modifications, software piracy, source code, copyright, software 
copyright infringement, software piracy forensics, database forensics, MIS forensics, AFC, SCAP, 
technical expert, substantial similarity test, CDAC 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Piracy is potentially possible at any stage in the lifetime of the software. If and when that happens, the 
original and pirated versions of the software will continue to be used contemporaneously. This being 
so, in the post-piracy period, the profile of the pirated1 could well be in a different pattern to that of the 
original2 as both the original developer as well as the pirate may modify the respective versions in 
their own ways. Because of this, although the original and the pirated software are prone to grow 
functionally in almost the same direction (because the post-piracy life time of the pirated software is in 
the same functional area of expertise as that of the original), the growth is expected to be with different 
modification strategies (because both are handled by different persons). This phenomenon of different 
patterns of growth is a very valuable and useful dimension of study for the expert in cyber forensics. A 
                                                 
1 Throughout this article, pirated means the allegedly pirated software 
2 Throughout this article, original means the version of the software that the complainant submits to the law enforcement 
agency for software piracy forensics. This article presupposes that the law enforcement agency has satisfactorily verified the 
legal aspects of the documentary evidence of copyright produced by the complainant and is convinced that the complainant is 
the copyright holder of this version of the alleged software.  
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2011 
 
72 
proper study of post-piracy modification of the pirated will contribute substantially to the reliability of 
software piracy forensic investigation. This article attempts to discuss the impact and implications of 
post-piracy modifications in software piracy forensics (or software copyright infringement 
investigation) and to suggest that proper amendments be made in the existing forensic approaches / 
techniques so that evidence concerning post-piracy modifications gets proper consideration and 
treatment. 
Software piracy forensic investigation often requires comparison of the original with the pirated by 
juxtaposing the two. In order to perform the task of comparing two software packages, several 
software tools are used and these tools are based mostly on academically accepted mathematical 
techniques and theoretical frameworks like Discourse Analysis (Van der Ejik, 1994), SMAT 
(Yamamoto et al, 2004), and MOSS (Lancaster and Culwin, 2004). A recently (November-2009) 
edited work “Handbook of Research on Computational Forensics, Digital Crime, and Investigation: 
Methods and Solutions” (Chang-Tsun Li, 2010) prescribes SCAP (Frantzeskou, 2007) for comparison 
of two software packages. An exception to all these (because of the judicial acceptance in the US) is 
the theoretical frame work called AFC (Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison) (Walker, 1996) which has 
been professionally implemented by a French software firm European Software Analysis Laboratory 
in the form of the product namely SIMILE Workshop (ESALab, 2007). All these techniques, 
theoretical frameworks and tools are capable in their respective areas of software piracy investigation. 
Even so, none of them properly and adequately deal with matters related to post-piracy modifications 
in the pirated and all these need to be made sensitive to the implications of post-piracy modifications.   
Post piracy modifications need also to be incorporated into many other theoretical proposals and 
studies in software piracy forensics. For instance, the Ginger Myles (2006, p.69), proposes watermark 
(as a weaker evidence) to indicate that “one program is likely to be a copy of the other”, needs further 
explanation on extending watermarking to post-piracy modifications in the pirated.  Anthony Reyes 
(2007) beautifully discusses areas of difficulties, misconceptions and flaws in the cyber investigative 
methodology by explaining techniques for preparing for prosecution, testifying, and incidence 
response, solving legal issues, conducting seizure procedure, performing data analysis, and preventing 
of cyber crimes, including software piracy, but this work requires further considerations on analysis of 
post-piracy schematic changes. Another example is the work on software forensics by Robert M. Slade 
(2004), where he explains from his experience, several ways of collecting evidence of software piracy 
and presents overviews of forensics programming, plagiarism detection, code analysis, source code 
recovery and even forensics linguistics. Even so, the book does not cover matters related to post-
piracy modifications in the pirated.  
2. ESTABLISHING THE CRIME 
As mentioned above, the starting point of the investigation into piracy is the juxtaposed comparison of 
the original and the alleged pirated versions. This delicate and demanding situation of comparing two 
software packages arises usually when one party lodges a complaint of software piracy or copyright 
infringement against the other. A full-fledged forensic investigation of the pirated software has to be 
done to establish piracy. As software piracy investigation involves technical comparison, the judge 
usually appoints an uninvolved cyber forensic expert for the task.  Given the source codes from two 
different software systems, the technical expert concentrates on digging out the pieces of potential 
evidence of copyright infringement by evaluating  the similarities and commonalities that form the 
basis for validating or invalidating the alleged crime. The duty of the cyber forensic expert is to 
establish possible piracy through a rigorous formulation of statistical occurrences of the data 
structures, variables, data base tables, fields, modules, procedures, logic, remark, error and blunders in 
the allegedly pirated software and arrive at several values, preferably in percentages, to indicate the 
strength of piracy (Author, 2009, p.54), all of which require comparing the original and the pirated 
source codes, database schemas and procedures. Alternatively, the cyber forensic expert can abstract 
the original as well as pirated, filter out globally common elements from them and then compare the 
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remaining two kernels in order to establish copyright infringement (Walker, 1996). Either way, the 
procedure needs to take into account evidence concerning post-piracy modifications. 
3. PROCEDURE 
As a prelude to comparing the two software systems, the cyber forensic expert can ask the original 
developer (the complainant) to make available their pre-modified version of the source code, the 
embedded images and finger prints, the database procedures and the database schemas that were 
prevailing at the time of piracy (see footnote 2 above). At the same time, the source code, the 
embedded images and finger prints, the database procedures and the database schemas of the pirated 
are generally made available for comparison by the police or judiciary through a seizure procedure 
(Authors, 2009, p.177) or through a disclosure procedure wherein the technical expert (or sometimes 
the plaintiff too) has direct access to the defendant’s source code (Hollaar, 2002, p103). (This 
procedure might vary from country to country). It is highly unlikely that this (or thus made available) 
version is the pre-modified version of the pirated software.  The seizure procedure usually ends up 
seizing some as-and-when available version, mostly a modified / customized version of the pirated 
software, leaving the cyber forensic expert with this version of the pirated software to compare with 
the original. 
4. THE IDENTIFICATION OF POST-PIRACY MODIFICATIONS 
The modified / customized version of the pirated software that is made available through the 
seizure would most certainly have gone through a few, if not quite a lot of, modifications. 
This being so, before listing out the similarities (and commonalities) and making an expert 
judgment from their statistical representation and profile, the cyber forensic expert has to first 
generate, ideally, the originally pirated pre-modified version of the software out of the seized 
version by identifying and filtering out the post-piracy modifications, if any, from it. These 
post-piracy modifications can be found in various parts of the pirated software, namely, the 
source code, object files, embedded fingerprints and images, database procedures, and/or the 
database schemas and so, the cyber forensic expert has to necessarily identify and filter out all 
identifiable post-piracy modifications from all these parts, one by one. The possibility of their 
tainting the statistical rigor of the results of the comparison will thus be eliminated or at least 
minimized. The expert has to first convert the seized, pirated into its pre-modified infant form. 
The objective of and hence the emphasis on this process is not the detection or confirmation 
of piracy but the identification and filtering out of all post-piracy modifications by a more 
rigorous scrutiny of  differences between  the two codes. The output of this initial process will 
be something closest to the pre-modified version, which forms the basis for a reliable eventual 
comparison with the original.  
5. POST-PIRACY MODIFICATIONS – THE WHY AND THE HOW 
The above facts demand a detailed study on post-piracy modifications and ways to incorporate their 
role, effect and impact in the report to the court. Different techniques to analyze post-piracy 
modifications are required because post piracy changes can happen along a variety of parameters, in a 
variety of ways, and for a variety of reasons not all of which may be visible, noticeable and reliable 
initially during the cyber forensic investigation.  However, on detailed investigation, they all can be 
seen to become relevant and can largely influence the cyber forensic report.  
Difference is not exculpation from piracy: While similarity between two sets of software is most 
certainly indicative of piracy, difference is not exculpation from piracy either. In fact it is the 
differences that trigger the need for careful observation since they may be the result of post-piracy 
modifications. Such modifications may be motivated by a number of factors. For instance, one 
motivation for modification could be a customer demanding an additional feature in the software. 
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Another could be a government-directive to be incorporated in business.  In both cases the software 
will have to be subsequently modified accordingly. In order to incorporate a customer request or 
government directive into the software, the pirate may modify, say, the structure of the table by 
introducing one or more new fields into it. While a government directive can bring about a 
modification in both original and the pirated (with different implementation patterns), the 
implementation of a customer request by the pirate brings about a change only in the pirated. Such a 
modification would induce difference between the pirated and the original data base tables and it is the 
duty of the cyber forensic expert to consider and properly question these differences during software 
piracy investigation. In addition to customer requirements and government directives, the pirate 
himself / herself may introduce intentional changes in the database schema in order to escape 
copyright violation litigations in the future and such intentional changes also cause questionable 
differences. It needs to be stressed that customer requests, government directives, and intentional 
changes are only some of the potential reasons and motivations that can cause questionable difference 
in the pirated from the original, and database is only one of the areas where such questionable 
differences can be found in the pirated.  
Differences exist in various forms: During the post-piracy lifetime of the software, the pirate might 
modify database schema (which formally defines the tables in each database, the fields in each table, 
and the relationships between fields and tables), by adding, removing or editing a few fields, as part of 
either the post implementation tuning up or of the customization of the pirated software. Thus, any 
difference found in the schema of the pirated can either be in the form of the presence of one or more 
additional fields (that are absent in the original) or absence of one or more fields (that are found in the 
original) or modifications in names and/or other properties of any of the fields already existing intact 
in both original as well as pirated.  
An example of suspected post-piracy modifications: These forms of post-piracy modifications and 
the resulting forensic challenges / difficulties3 can be better explained with an example of a database-
related situation. Table-1, which was extracted from a software comparison report (Author, 2002, 
p.14), gives a sample of database table-level comparison. The first part of the table corresponds to the 
original and the second, to the pirated.  Fifteen out of sixteen fields in the original are found exactly in 
the same sequence in the pirated also (93% similarity or 93 % of the fields in the original can be 
mapped to at least one field in the pirated) and 15 out of 21 fields in the pirated are found in original 
also exactly in the same sequence (71% similarity). While these two percentages are fair enough to 
give some clue to possible piracy, there is still scope for the expert to further analyze the two database 
schemas with the intention of improving on the above two percentages, suggestive of suspected piracy.  
A further analysis of the remaining 1 field in the original and 6 fields in the pirated results in more 
reliable percentages (of nomenclature level piracy) than the above two. This is better explained here 
with the one field namely USERNAME in the original which can be seen to have some 
correspondence with two fields, namely, CREATEDUSER and MODIFIEDUSER in the pirated. Just 
as the field name USERNAME is one of the globally used variable names to save the name of the 
author of the transaction, the two field names, viz., CREATEDUSER and MODIFIEDUSER in the 
pirated are also globally used to save the names of the authors of the transaction and thus, a 
correspondence can be attributed between them. While the field, USERNAME, has some degree of 
nomenclature level similarity with CREATEDUSER and MODIFIEDUSER, the degree of 
dissimilarity can be possibly because of a post-piracy development, in which the ‘pirate’ himself may 
have replaced USERNAME with two fields, namely, MODIFIEDUSER and CREATEDUSER. This 
                                                 
3 These challenges / difficulties are usually explained using theoretical situations involving source codes but the situations 
used in this article are live and data base related. Live situations are often more valuable than theoretical ones. Moreover, any 
post-piracy modification in the database would generally subsume the corresponding change in the respective source code 
too.  
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possibility is further strengthened by the similarity4 in the other properties of these fields. For instance, 
all these three fields are of type CHAR, and are of length six (see Table-1). Thus, this strong 
possibility of post-piracy modification demands either re-calculation of the above two percentages or 
incorporating this possibility separately in the cyber forensic report. By mapping USERNAME in the 
original to both the CREATEDUSER and MODIFIEDUSER in the pirated, it can be seen that each of 
the 16 fields in the original can be mapped to at least one field in the pirated, and thus the above given 
93% similarity in effect becomes 100%. Similarly, by mapping both the CREATEDUSER and 
MODIFIEDUSER in the pirated to USERNAME in the original, it can be seen that 17 out of 21 fields 
in the pirated can be mapped to at least one field in the original, which increases the above given 71% 
to 81%. As 17 out of 21 fields in the pirated could successfully be mapped to at least one field in the 
original, the remaining 4 fields, namely ACCTRANSCHEQUEDATE, ACCTRANSISSUEBANK, 
INTERNALENTRY, and VOUCHERTYPE, also require further attention and analysis, as these 4 
fields also can possibly be post-piracy fields.  Thus, an analysis of the modifications happened in the 
schemas of the pirated does shed further light on the suspected piracy. This example illustrates how a 
post-piracy modification can happen along database fields (one of the above listed parameters of a 
database) and shows a way for the expert to overcome the resulting forensic challenges / difficulties by 
using his / her expertise, intuition and common sense in identifying post-piracy modifications.  The 
test used in the above example is “Substantial similarity “ test (Davis, 1992). 
                                                 
4 Further, such strong similarity can also happen if the software was originally made by the respondent but later pirated and 
then unethically copyrighted by the complainant. The law enforcement agency needs to collect evidence from the respondent 
and from other sources and prepare the case accordingly. 
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Table -1: Comparison of the structures of two database tables (Author, 2002, p.14)  
Original software's database table structure 
TABLE NAME: ACCOUNTTRANSACTIONS 
Field names and properties 
1 ACCOUNTHEAD CHAR(8) NOT NULL 
2 FINYEAR CHAR(4) NOT NULL 
3 ACCTRANSVOUCHERNUMBER CHAR(8) NOT NULL 
4 ACCTRANSBILLNUMBER CHAR(11) 
5 ACCTRANSCHEQUENUMBER CHAR(10) 
6 ACCTRANSCREDIT NUMERIC(12,2) DEFAULT 0.00 
7 ACCTRANSDATE DATE 
8 ACCTRANSDEBIT NUMERIC(12,2) DEFAULT 0.00 
9 ACCTRANSDESCRIPTION CHAR(300) 
10 ACCTRANSRECDATE DATE 
11 ACCTRANSRECONCILE CHAR(1) DEFAULT 'N' 
12 ACCTRANSTYPE CHAR(2) 
13 COSTCENTRE CHAR(2) 
14 DIVISION CHAR(2) 
15 USERNAME CHAR(6) NOT NULL 
16 MACHINEID CHAR(10) NOT NULL 
Seized ( allegedly pirated ) software's database table structure 
TABLE NAME: ACCOUNTTRANSACTIONS 
Field names and properties 
1 ACCOUNTHEAD ACCOUNTHEAD_DM /*CHAR(8) CHARACTER SET NONE*/ NOT NULL 
2 FINYEAR /*RDB$914*/ CHAR(4) CHARACTER SET NONE NOT NULL 
3 ACCTRANSVOUCHERNUMBER /*RDB$915*/ CHAR(8) CHARACTER SET NONE NOT NULL 
4 ACCTRANSBILLNUMBER /*RDB$916 */ CHAR (11) CHARACTER SET NONE 
5 ACCTRANSCHEQUENUMBER /*RDB$917 */ CHAR(10) CHARACTER SET NONE 
6 ACCTRANSCREDIT AMOUNT_DM /*NUMERIC(15,2 */ DEFAULT 0.00 
7 ACCTRANSDATE /* RDB$918 */ DATE 
8 ACCTRANSDEBIT AMOUNT_DM /*NUMERIC(15,2) */ DEFAULT 0.00 
9 ACCTRANSDESCRIPTION /*RDB$919 */ CHAR(300) CHARACTER SET NONE 
10 ACCTRANSCHEQUEDATE /*RDB$920 */ DATE 
11 ACCTRANSISSUEBANK NAME_DM /*CHAR(50) CHARACTER SET NONE*/ 
12 ACCTRANSRECDATE /*RDB$921 */ DATE 
13 ACCTRANSRECONCILE BVALUE_DM /*CHAR(1) CHARACTER SET NONE */ DEFAULT 'N' 
14 ACCTRANSTYPE BOOKCODE_DM /*CHAR(2) CHARACTER SET NONE */ 
15 COSTCENTRE /*RDB$922*/ CHAR(2) CHARACTER SET NONE 
16 DIVISION /*RDB$923*/ CHAR(2) CHARACTER SET NONE 
17 INTERNALENTRY BVALUE_DM /*CHAR(1) CHARACTER SET NONE */ DEFAULT 'N' 
18 VOUCHERTYPE /*RDB$924*/ CHAR(1) CHARACTER SET NONE*/ DEFAULT 'E' 
19 MODIFIEDUSER USERID_DM /*CHAR(6) CHARACTER SET NONE */ 
20 CREATEDUSER USERID_DM /*CHAR(6) CHARACTER SET NONE */ NOT NULL 
21 MACHINEID MACHINEID_DM /*CHAR(10) CHARACTER SET NONE */ 
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Post-piracy modifications and AFC test: If the above investigation is done using the AFC test (the 
recognized test in the US judiciary for software copyright infringement investigation), most of the data 
base fields mentioned above can be filtered out (from the original as well as pirated) during the 
filtration stage of test (Hollaar, 2002, p89) and in such case these fields will not be available for final 
comparison. This is because, most of these data base fields carry names which are globally not 
uncommon and thus these fields may be treated under “widely accepted programming practices within 
the computer industry”. This sort of filtration of AFC can seriously impair the evaluation of the 
evidence concerning post-piracy modifications in the pirated and so defeat the purpose of the software 
copyright infringement investigation. Thus, this sort of filtration is tantamount to an act of discarding 
valuable digital evidence of post-piracy modifications in the databases.  (What is required here is to re-
design the filtration stage of AFC so as to avoid filtering out the possible evidence of post-piracy 
modifications from the pirated.) 
Factors encouraging post-piracy modifications: Two factors that encourage the possibility and 
extent of post-piracy modifications are; (a) the time lapse between the actual act of piracy and the 
complaint from the original developer; and (b) the market of the pirated version. It is commonsense to 
believe that there is a direct though not systematic connection between the extent of post-piracy 
modifications and the time available to do it on the one hand and the nature and extent of the 
consumer (of the pirated version) on the other. A good illustration of the importance of the time factor 
is the suit Sesame Software Solutions Vs. Perfect Software, filed in 2007, the final verdict of which is 
still pending in a court in India. The complainant in the case had alleged that four of his former 
employees had appropriated his software product and were marketing it as their own since the time 
they left his employment six years earlier. The alleged software seized on court order through a raid 
(Author, 2007) was the latest (as-is where-is) version and very probably a modified version. The court 
appointed the cyber forensic division of Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (CDAC, 
Thiruvananthapuram, India) as the expert to investigate the piracy.  In a case like this, since there is 
every possibility that the software would have been modified drastically during the six years, no 
attempt by the CDAC to compare the original with the pirated would yield realistic results if the post-
piracy modifications are ignored, particularly in view of the long period of six years involved. The 
incidence of such suits may well be on the rise globally. 
Choice of Tool matters: In the situation of software piracy forensics, often what determines the 
credibility of the result is not just a matter of the professional status of the expert, or the dexterity of 
the analysis but also of the appropriate choice of tools and approaches used in the comparison of 
software. For instance, the file comparison utility software used by CDAC in the above case was not 
versatile enough to identify and filter out the post-piracy modifications. The weakness arising from 
non-use of the required tool is illustrated in Table 2, extracted from pages 71 and 119 of the cyber 
forensic analysis report performed by CDAC (2008) in the above mentioned suit, Sesame Software 
Solutions Vs. Perfect Software. This table provides an instance of table level comparison, in which the 
file comparison utility software (whose name is not mentioned in the report) used by CDAC found that 
some of the data base fields in the pirated do not prima facie appear to be fully similar to those in the 
original (see the last part of table-2).  Nowhere in table-2 (and also in the report) is there any mention 
about the possible post-piracy modifications that could have happened during the six-years of post-
piracy life of the pirated. This laxity can be because of the lack of skills of the file comparison utility 
used in this case by CDAC. A supplementing and in-depth manual comparison (with the intention of 
identifying the post-piracy modifications) would have easily revealed that the fields AcgCode and 
ACGrCode differ only by the character ‘r’, AcsCode and AcSuCode, by the ‘u’ and AcsName and 
AcSuName  by the ‘u’. In other words, the first three fields in the pirated are different from the 
respective three fields of the original only by a single character each and this difference can possibly 
be a result of post-piracy modifications with an explicit intention of obfuscating similarities. This 
possibility has not been explained properly in the report. The cyber forensic expert could have 
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‘properly’ reported to the court that the three “relatively similar fields” (see Table-2) differ only by a 
single character and that this minor difference (favouring the alleged culprit) could possibly have been 
brought about by an intentional act of obfuscation. In other words, a thorough expert would question 
and further explore manually the minor, nominal degree of dissimilarity in the three “relatively similar 
fields” to weed out the possibility of a deliberate act of obfuscation and judiciously report the findings 
to the court.  Once the questionable nature of such factors has been pre-supposed, that would then 
logically form a legitimate precedent for a similar investigation of the remaining two fields namely 
UsrCode and UsrEnteredOn, which too may well be suspected as a post-piracy add-on. Almost all 
other table level comparison results in this report (CDAC, 2008) are incomplete in this manner.  Quite 
a lot of such superficial differences, thus, need further manual supplementary analysis to establish 
their legitimacy and such manual analysis draws upon clear insight, commonsense, hands-on 
experience, and intuitive skill of the expert. 
 
Table-2: Results of comparison of the two database table structures (CDAC, 2008, p.71, p.119) 
Original software's database table structure 
TABLE NAME: AcSubGroup 
Field names and properties 
1 [ACGrCode] [int] NULL 
2 [AcSuCode] [int] NULL 
3 [AcSuName] [varchar] (30) NULL 
    
Seized ( allegedly pirated ) software's database table structure 
TABLE NAME: AcSubGroup 
Field names and properties 
1 [AcgCode] [tinyint] NOT NULL 
2 [AcsCode] [tinyint] NOT NULL 
3 [AcsName] [varchar] (40) NOT NULL 
4 [UsrCode] [varchar] (5) NOT NULL 
5 [UsrEnteredOn] [datetime] NOT NULL 
    
Results of comparison of the above two table 
  Number of fields in the allegedly pirated: 5 
  Number of fields in the original : 3 
  Same fields : 0 
  Relatively similar fields : 3 
  Not similar fields : 2 fields in the allegedly pirated and 0 fields in the original 
 
A further point to look into while choosing the right tool is the tool’s ability to analyze the positioning 
or placement of the post-piracy add-ons in the software. During the post-piracy modifications, the 
pirate may add additional fields at the end of the table structure or in between two existing fields in the 
table structure. Even if several modern data base management systems (DBMSs) provide techniques to 
introduce the new field logically in between two fields, say, between 4th & 5th fields, programmers 
usually tend to add the new field at the end of the table. Some DBMSs provide necessary software 
facility to add a new field without letting the user be bothered about the position of the new field in the 
database table and these tools usually place the new field at the end of the respective database table. 
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Often programmers either opt to add the additional field at the end of the table or simply don’t care 
about inserting the additional field in the proper logical position. Some of them just use the software 
facility to add a new field and simply don’t bother about where the software facility places the new 
field in the table. What is more important for the programmers is not the positioning of insertion of the 
additional field but the establishing of proper relationship. Irrespective of where the additional field is 
added (physically positioned), programmers can easily establish proper relationships or use proper 
SQL statements to display (or use) the additional field in any report generated by the software, 
logically, and in proper places. All these mean that even though post-piracy fields can be seen 
anywhere in the table, there are greater chances of finding them at the end of the table5. This also 
means that any difference found among the ending fields of the respective tables of the original and 
the pirated (or any successfully-unmapped fields at the end of the pirated table) can possibly be due to 
post-piracy modifications and so, special analysis of ending fields (with extra effort to identify and 
filter out post-piracy modifications) can yield reliable forensic result. For instance, Table-2 contains 
two unmapped fields UsrCode and UsrEnteredOn. . These two successfully-unmapped fields (see 
explanation on table-2 above) appear at the end of the database table in the pirated and so, the presence 
of these two fields (in the pirated) are to be further analysed. 
External evidence of post-piracy modifications can exist: In some cases, in order to prove that a 
particular difference found was caused by post-piracy modifications and that the pre-modified version 
of the pirated had greater similarity with the original, the expert may require external supporting 
evidence, such as official documents. Log books (or documents for the software modifications done) 
and government directives (or documents initiating modifications in the software) belonging to post-
piracy period are pieces of potential evidence acceptable to the court and the dates appear in these 
documents can be taken as evidence for post-piracy modification.  In addition to log books and 
government directives, any official document that carries the date on which a particular new facility 
(say, a new MIS report) has been put to use by the client of the pirate, may be of help to the cyber 
forensic expert to argue unequivocally that the difference in the pirated is attributable to a post-piracy 
modification. 
Summary of the discussion: In short, just as similarities need not always indicate piracy (Authors, 
2009, p.176), differences need not always indicate non-piracy either. If, by establishing a 
schematically tangible patterning or mapping, the expert can identify the differences as attributable to 
post-piracy development, particularly suggestive of having been ‘contrived’, then the whole software 
comparison process may require closer attention along several parameters in different ways before 
rejecting or confirming piracy.  
Need for judiciary-friendly presentation of results: The results of the analysis, when presented in 
transparent tabular form (to the judge) might provide more convincingly effective forensic evidence.  
It is hoped that Table-3 below, which is derived from Authors (2009, p.180), but specifically fine-
tuned for post-piracy modifications, provides a seminal illustration for such a tabular presentation of, 
for instance, a database piracy forensics result6. Finally, it is needless to say that the result of analysis 
should be presented by cyber forensic expert as his/her views, strictly in an un-interpretive manner, 
because the right to interpretation solely rests with the court (Slade, 2004).   
Further scope of this research: Needless to say, questionable differences between the pirated and the 
original can be found not only in data bases but also in other parts of the pirated, and for each part, 
along a variety of parameters. Some of the identifiable parts of software are source codes, databases, 
embedded images, fingerprints and so on. Again, one part can encode differences along several 
parameters. In case of source code, for instance, questionable differences can occur along parameters 
                                                 
5 A statistical study to enumerate this chance is beyond the scope of this article. 
6 The test used in this example is “Substantial similarity” test (Davis, 1992). For other tests / approaches (for example, AFC), 
similar judiciary-friendly reports need to be arrived at. 
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like program variables, loop variables, names of functions, procedure calls, algorithms and so on. In 
the case of database, some of the parameters are field name, field type, field length and so on. In any 
case, post-piracy modifications along these parameters can make the software piracy investigation, 
delicate and demanding. This offers further scope in this research. 
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Table -3: The proposed format for presenting the result of comparison of two database tables 
(post-piracy modifications are also considered) 
i. Similarity in the table names: ___% commonality. 
ii. Length of the ‘original’ table: a  
iii. Length of the ‘pirated’ table: b 
iv. Percentage of similarity in lengths: (a/b)*100 
v. Field count of the ‘original’: c 
vi. Field count of the ‘pirated’: d 
vii. Percentage of similarity in field count: (c/d)*100 
viii. Perfect commonality in the names of fields:  __ out of __ names of fields in the ‘original’ are 
found in ‘pirated’ also. So, ___% commonality 
ix. Perfect commonality in name and data type among fields:  __ out of ___ fields have the 
common name and data types. So, ___% commonality in name and data type. 
x. Perfect commonality in name, data type and length among fields:  ___out of  ___ fields have 
same names, data types and length. So, ___% commonality 
xi. Perfect commonality in name, data type, length and the default values set in the fields: 
___out of  ___ fields have same names, data types, length and default values. So, ___% 
commonality. 
xii. Perfect commonality in sequence of the fields with same name: ___out of  ___ fields with same 
name, do occur in the same sequence. So, ___% commonality. 
xiii. Perfect commonality in sequence of the fields with same name, data type, length and default 
values: ___out of  ___ fields (with same name, data type, length and default values) do occur in 
the same sequence. So, ___% commonality. 
xiv. Count of comparable (mappable) fields including suspected-post-piracy modified / created 
fields:  __ out of __ fields in the ‘pirated’ can be perfectly or approximately mapped (in terms of 
names) to at least one field in the ‘original’. So, _____ % comparable fields in the ‘pirated’. 
xv. Count of non-mappable but suspected-post-piracy fields, including ending fields: __ out of __ 
fields in the ‘pirated’ could not be properly mapped to any of the fields in the ‘original’ but they 
can be suspected to be post-piracy modifications. So, _____ % incomparable but suspected fields 
in the ‘pirated’ 
xvi. Count of non-mappable, non-suspected fields: __ out of __ fields in the ‘pirated’ could not be 
properly mapped to any of the fields in the ‘original’ and do not provide any clue to be suspected 
as post piracy modification. So, _____ % incomparable, non-suspected fields in the ‘pirated’ 
xvii. Inference: Piracy is confirmed / largely suspected / loosely suspected / not suspected. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
To sum up, one can conclude that observed surface differences between the original and pirated does 
not necessarily provide automatic grounds for exculpation from piracy in that many times much of the 
observed differences could be a direct result of post-piracy modifications both in the original and the 
pirated. In fact it is the differences that trigger the need for careful observation since they may be the 
result of post-piracy modifications. Such modifications may be motivated by a number of factors. A 
proper study of post-piracy modification, using the most appropriate tools both automatic and manual 
especially in the data base schemas of the pirated will unearth the differences that are invariantly 
attributable to post-piracy modifications, and thus will contribute substantially to the reliability of 
cyber forensic investigation. Some of elements discussed in this paper, like the positioning of the post-
piracy fields and dates of post-piracy modification, are often incorrectly discounted as not too reliable; 
but under clever and careful handling, they can provide valuable supporting evidence. Ideally, in the 
interests of justice, a technical expert should be able to identify and put to use some or all the 
techniques of identifying post-piracy modifications to supplement the digital evidence (put forward by 
the automated tools, established judiciary approaches etc.) and other physical evidence.   
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